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Margaret atwood’s 2003 novel Oryx and Crake is a dystopic and satirical fable set in the aftermath of a biotechnological apoca-lypse. a plague of horrific proportions, disseminated as a “Trojan 
horse” virus hidden in a panacea sex pill, has liquefied most of the world’s 
population, leaving the protagonist, Snowman, as the “Last Man” wandering 
a landscape overrun by predatory phactory-pharmed GM hybrids and popu-
lated by a tribe of genetically engineered post-human noble savages.
When expressed concisely, the scenario of the novel appears hyperbolic. 
Oryx and Crake is a text that mobilizes such a vast array of futurological 
speculations and mythological and literary archetypes, however, that no 
hyperbole is too absurd to describe it. Further, it is a text in which the 
function and value of language, rhetorical and otherwise, is consistently 
foregrounded.
The novel turns on a number of myths or archetypes. With the depic-
tion of cloned and genetically engineered life-forms and viruses comes the 
Frankensteinian myth of ex-utero creation coupled with its Promethean twin 
of forbidden knowledge and technology out of control. The ambiguity of 
technoscience is foregrounded here, and the figure of the pharmakon — the 
poison that is also a cure — works as a key theoretical index of this ambi-
guity. as is fitting for a post-apocalyptic novel, there is also the invocation 
of the Last Man as survivor of the destruction and lone surveyor of all that 
is left, and the figuring of the apocalypse as a cleansing renewal making 
way for a millennial reign of peace. These myths are played out upon two 
background frameworks: the framework of a biotechnological revisiting of 
post-Cold-War eschatology; and the framework of a linguistic and literary 
“magic” performed by capitalist producers upon willing consumers, and by 
biotechnologists upon “nature.” Within these frameworks, the Last Man 
is a survivor on two counts: he is a sole survivor of the destruction, but 
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also a sole representative of the “human” as a species potentially to be sup-
planted by genetically engineered post-human beings. in the novel, language, 
writing, and thus technics are linked to the beginning and end of “life” 
and the “human” as they are commonly understood. as well as examining 
the ambiguous and eschatological role of technics and biotechnology in 
atwood’s text, this paper will explore the way in which the tekhnai of lan-
guage and writing are implicated in the definition of human life.
The cumulative effect of these various myths and frameworks is to pose the 
question of “the end of the human.” Such a question has, these days, a reason-
able amount of cultural currency, and it also has many dimensions, allowing 
examination across phenomenological, ontological, and biological arenas. 
and yet, at the same time, such a question is impossible to read — it is an 
abyme for thought, an incoherency. regardless of the various ways in which 
it has been asked, it remains incumbent on us to question the question: How 
can we speak of the end of the human, when “we” are still here, insisting 
on our humanity? and could there ever not be a “we”? Oryx and Crake is 
thus a speculative fiction, a reflection on what it might mean to posit an end 
to the human within a biotechnological scenario. it places the human, as 
well as modernity and what is termed, often disingenuously, civilization, in 
jeopardy, partially in crisis, and most certainly in question. 
reviews of the novel have been decidedly mixed. reviews written by 
pundits or writers of science fiction, such as John Clute’s review at Scifi.com, 
concentrate on the status of atwood’s novel as speculative fiction not sci-
ence fiction, choosing to lambaste atwood for attempting to differentiate 
herself from the space travel, teleportation, and Martians aspect of sci-fi 
(atwood “Writing”) while failing to write a novel that thinks outside the 
banality of “the near future as envisioned by Hollywood” (Clute). in the 
essay published on the Oryx and Crake website, atwood states that she has 
written speculative fiction, not science fiction, because she wants her novel 
to be understood as a direct extrapolation from, and thus critique of, con-
temporary society and technology (atwood, “Writing”). in her estimation, 
the difference between speculative and science fiction rests on differences 
in their relation to the future: speculative fiction takes a questioning and 
critical eye towards the future in order to reflect on the present, whereas 
science fiction is concerned more with an imagining of the future as such. 
Clute, however, argues that science fiction has always been speculative in 
atwood’s sense, and interprets atwood’s position, with Gary K. Wolfe, as 
market rather than genre differentiation: “She’s not demeaning the SF market 
oryx and craKe 107
so much as protecting the atwood market” (qtd. in Clute). Other reviewers 
not concerned with differentiating between speculative and science fiction 
still find the novel problematic. The New York Times’s Michiko Kahutani 
described it as a “lame piece of sci-fi humbug.” 
in other circles, atwood’s novel has been more warmly received. Stephen 
dunning reads Oryx and Crake as a cautionary tale about the dangers of 
quantitative science and technology superseding, and exploiting, “qualitative 
human concerns” (89). dunning’s argument rests on an implicit separation 
of “human” concerns from the concerns of science and technology, and he 
sees atwood’s critique residing in the position that scientific practices must 
be tempered by human wisdom. For similar reasons, writers on biotechnol-
ogy have also welcomed the novel because of atwood’s argument that the 
book is concerned not so much with biotechnology per se, but with the 
human use of such techniques. a review published in Nature Biotechnology (a 
division of the Nature Publishing Group, which publishes the renowned sci-
entific journal Nature) gleefully quotes atwood’s claims that “it’s not biotech 
that’s dangerous … . it is people’s fears and desires” (Louët). atwood herself, 
in a fascinating move, has made similar claims on the website that accom-
panies the book (www.oryxandcrake.com), to which readers are referred in 
the book’s acknowledgements. There, she positions the book as a treatise 
on the ambiguous potential of powerful tools, and the role of humanity in 
determining the fit use for such tools: “Our tools have become very powerful. 
Hate, not bombs, destroys cities. desire, not bricks, rebuilds them. do we as 
a species have the emotional maturity and the wisdom to use our powerful 
tools well?” (“an interview”).
Setting aside the ramifications of atwood’s decision to publish authorial 
comment on the novel in an electronic form that is directly “linked” to 
the novel itself (described by one critic as “an abstruse desire to manipulate 
the novel past what is generally perceived as the accepted limitations, or 
boundaries, of authorial influence” [Cole 1]), what does atwood’s position 
suggest? She argues that it is not technics or technology or biotechnology 
that is dangerous; it is the uses human beings put these things to. The end 
of the human is a human problem, not a technical one. This is a common 
enough position: technology is “neutral”; guns don’t kill people — people 
do. and yet this is also to artificially separate the gun from the person who 
wields it, as if that person had nothing to do with the existence of the gun 
in the first place, as if the gun were forged in a void, bereft of politics and 
of culture. This is also to assume that the practice of using a gun is not a 
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technical practice. While atwood may attempt to distance herself from a 
wholesale demonization of biotechnology by claiming that it is human fears 
and desires that drive events, i would argue that, perhaps despite itself, the 
novel in fact presents a different position, one more ambiguous and ultim-
ately divided.
Firstly, the distinction between biotechnology as a technics and the 
hubristic human use of biotechnology is a false distinction. The hubris and 
overreaching that atwood wishes to distinguish from some kind of dispas-
sionate technical practice stems from the same context as the latter, and a 
cautionary tale about the dangers of overreaching must at the same time be 
a cautionary tale about technics. Thus, while critics like Stephen dunning 
see no problem in keeping atwood’s homo sapiens separate from tekhnē, other 
critics, such as Chung-Hao Ku and danette diMarco, see atwood’s con-
cerns focusing on the more ambiguous figure of homo faber, “man the maker,” 
a properly technical “man” who is not separate from his tools (see Ku; see 
also diMarco). 
Secondly, while the end of the human may come about as a result of 
human hubris and anxiety, and is certainly presented as the end of a race or 
species, it is also positioned as the end of language, the end of an essentially 
technical, extra-human, or, in the terms of Bernard Stiegler, “epigenetic” 
infrastructure that radically exceeds anything to be considered biologically 
human. That is to say, the end of the human cannot be imagined without 
the end of technics, and any attempt to separate the human from the tech-
nical would be to elide the many ways in which humanity and technics are 
intertwined, sharing a joint zero-hour, both a beginning and an ending.
* * *
The novel opens with Snowman living in a tree to avoid roaming packs of 
“wolvogs” and other hybridized creatures. Both civilization and the environ-
ment have broken down, humanity has been reduced to a static tableau of toxic 
corpses, and Snowman is left a scavenger, living off scrounged foodstuffs from 
abandoned trailer parks, and avoiding the burning rays of an ozone-depleted 
sun. Snowman also appears to act as caretaker to a group of naked innocents 
called the Children of Crake. it slowly emerges that these “children” are the 
biotechnological spawn of Crake’s massive r&d budget and the Paradice 
Project, and that the genetically altered world Snowman lives in also came 
about as part of that process.
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The book then begins to tell the story, in f lashback, of how all this 
came about. it follows Snowman (a.k.a. Jimmy) through his life in the 
Compounds, walled corporate precincts for the totalitarian biotech com-
panies that breed, amongst other organic contraptions, “pigoons” with extra 
kidneys for xeno-transplantation. early in his life, Jimmy befriends Crake, 
a brilliant and somewhat diffident character whose intelligence and misan-
thropic ambivalence propel him quickly towards a career in the Compounds. 
Crake later becomes the head of the top-secret Paradice Project housed in the 
rejoovenesense Compound, and it is this project that leads to the wholesale 
breakdown of civilization and humanity that we witness at the opening of 
the book. The book alternates between flashbacks to this past, and the pres-
ent, where Snowman undertakes a dangerous journey to the scene of the 
crime, the Compound where Crake’s experiment began. The novel closes 
with Snowman returning to his home to discover that he is no longer alone; 
a few ragtag human survivors have made camp nearby, and he prepares to 
either greet them or kill them, his fellow remnants of a defunct race.
With evident rhetorical glee, atwood populates this biotechnological night-
mare with a number of satirical extrapolations from contemporary science and 
multinational capitalism. Biotechnology and pharmaceutical giants with names 
like HelthWyzer, Organinc, and rejoovenesense market a range of designer 
drugs, happy pills, and cosmetic surgery make-over packages: HappiCuppa, 
anooYoo, NooSkin, BlyssPluss. designer babies are ordered from infantade, 
Foetility, and Perfectababe. Simulated foodstuffs and the product of biotech-
nologically altered animals abound: “ersatz but edible” shrimp paste (272), 
ChickieNobs Nubbins, SoyOBoy burgers and sardines. Laboratory-spliced 
hyperanimals of all kinds roam freely: the snat, the pigoon, the rakunk, the 
wolvog. in all, the world depicted is a fully altered world, and a fully alterable 
world. This is a post-genomic world, a world in which genomic sequencing 
is something that has already been surpassed, and that presents no barriers to 
science. at the same time, this “high science” is echoed in a “low science” 
that results in the aforementioned artificial foodstuffs. Hybridization, muta-
tion, and simulation are the primary orders of the day, and these logics are 
threaded through culture and science at all levels.
Geopolitically, the world of the novel is divided into the producers and 
the consumers, the “kings and dukes” (28) who oversee and control the pro-
cess of production, and the seething masses of the general public. Vaguely 
reminiscent of a feudal monarchist state (i think of Prince Harry escap-
ing the castle and slumming it with Falstaff and the whores), this world 
110 Scl/Élc
also invokes similar divisions in recent science fiction, such as the division 
between the “Multis” and the “Glops” in Marge Piercy’s He, She and It. 
atwood manifests this divide between rich and poor, haves and have-nots, 
in the splitting of urban environments into the Pleeblands — places of filth, 
disease, poverty, bioterror, and chaos — and the Compounds — walled, 
secure, tightly-controlled and policed districts of biotechnological and cap-
italist production.
The Pleeblands, once called “cities,” are characterized as places of unrule, 
of chaos, of a dangerous, cloying multiplicity and plurality: “asymmetries, 
deformities: the faces here were a far cry from the regularity of the 
Compounds. There were even bad teeth” (288). even images of artistic 
and self-expression are, here, made to appear as mutations, as if the desire 
to express oneself artistically (as opposed to biotechnologically) is in some 
way a maladaption. indeed, mutation and pollution are the overriding fac-
tors of Pleebland life; manufactured bio-agents that liquefy their victims 
circulate freely; visitors from the Compounds are encouraged to inoculate 
themselves before entering, and to wear ‘nose cones’ to filter out microbes 
and particulate matter; sexuality in the Pleeblands is open, raw and licen-
tious; prostitution and nudie bars abound.
There is the sense of a post-human bazaar economy, reminiscent of the 
street scenes in ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982); there are cosmopol-
itan, clamouring spaces rich with variety, fecundity, sexuality, intrigue, and 
the fluid exchange of biocapital: “There was so much to see — so much 
being hawked, so much being offered”; “People come here from all over the 
world — they shop around. Gender, sexual orientation, height, colour of 
skin and eyes — it’s all on order, it can all be done or redone” (288, 289). 
The isolation and free exchange of biological elements that are characteristic 
of much biotechnological research, and their increasing particularization 
and thus commodification, have reached an apotheosis in this society. The 
Pleeblands are also both a testing ground or live-in laboratory for biotech-
nological and pharmaceutical possibilities, and an index of the changing 
state, and status, of the “human,” given such great possibilities for modifica-
tion across all strata of biological being: epidermic, psychic, and genetic. in 
the same way that biotechnological practices of “pharming” use the body 
as a factory for the production of elements for xeno-transplantation, the 
laboratory, here, moves out of its traditional confined space and into the 
biosphere. The “experimental way of life” that donna Haraway situates at 
the root of the scientific laboratory is “liberated” in atwood’s text, and set 
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to run on automatic in the world at large (Haraway 15): “The whole world 
is now one vast uncontrolled experiment … and the doctrine of unintended 
consequences is in full spate” (atwood 228).
The Compounds, on the other hand, are safe, controlled, biologically 
monitored, and secure, and what they produce is done under the guise of an 
altruistic desire to better human life. They represent the height of corpora-
tized, technoscientific, biotechnological culture. “CorpSeCorps” security 
personnel patrol the borders, interrogate visitors, and investigate untoward 
occurrences and suspicious persons. There is a distinctive lack of criticism, 
or of a plurality of viewpoints; indeed, any dissenting voices that are heard 
in the novel are usually heard posthumously, as a suicide turns into a murder 
and rumours spread about what they knew and who knew that they knew. 
in a speculative fashion, this scenario is a manifestation of the 1990s scene 
in the United States that donna Haraway describes in Modest_Witness:
The spectrum of science policy discourse in the United States in the 
1990s makes even mentioning such things [as democratic participation 
in technoscience or engaging in debates in education about science and 
technology] appear to be evidence of hopeless naïveté and nostalgia for a 
moment of critical, public, democratic science that never existed. (94)
The Compounds encapsulate corporate “yes” culture in a spatial metaphor 
of bringing together into one place all those who have “opted in,” who have 
internalized the goals, truth, and ethics of the company as their own, and 
excluding or expelling everything that is threatening to this homeostasis.
The distinction between Pleeblands and Compounds turns on the way 
in which biotechnological or manufactured agents and products are treated 
and represented. The “hostile” bioforms of the Pleeblands are considered 
quite distinct from the “friendly” bioforms of the Compounds: the pigoons, 
calmly and benevolently producing superfluous human kidneys in their 
bodies; the BlyssPluss pill and the NooSkin makeover, legitimate solutions 
to “medical” problems. The Pleeblands are not “productive” in the same 
way as the Compounds; they deal in revolt and disease, their “splices” are 
destructive, not therapeutic. another distinction on which the difference 
between the Pleeblands and the Compounds turns is that between the arts 
and science, in which the arts are debased through their association with 
linguistic verbiage and ad copy, and the sciences are associated with the lofty 
aims of rearranging the “building blocks of life” for capital gain.
Of course, there is a satirical dimension to the manner in which the dis-
tinctions between Pleebland and Compound are drawn up that renders them 
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shaky. despite an implicit valuing of scientific endeavour over marketing 
manipulation, the degree to which the product of scientific endeavour relies 
on marketing slogans and catchy brandnames to “perform” suggests that 
the inside/outside dialectic, which hovers behind the distinction between 
the Pleeblands and the Compounds, is already deconstructed. recalling 
Haraway’s emphasis on the material-semiotic make-up of technoscience, sci-
ence in atwood’s text functions equally as a vehicle of rhetoric and fashion, 
and as a vehicle of scientific development. The “progress” science represents 
is in fact an imagined, fantasized progress, a lifestyle option disguised as a 
step forward. despite an appearance of scientificity, the research conducted 
in the Compounds, and the products shipped from them, is fundamentally 
consumer-oriented. The litany of products produced at anooYoo — “pills to 
make you fatter, thinner, hairier, balder, whiter, browner, blacker, yellower, 
sexier, and happier” (248) — suggest an inexorable and cyclical logic of 
product diversification and market differentiation. The Compounds need 
the Pleeblands, and science needs the market.
Crake, as one of the Compounds’ most prized researchers, encapsulates 
this dual logic, which is also the logic of the pharmakon. The term pharmakon, 
which appears numerous times in Plato’s Phaedrus and in other Platonic 
texts, and which plays a key role in the analysis of the Phaedrus derrida 
conducts in Dissemination, can mean medicine, remedy, drug, charm, phil-
tre, recipe, colour, pigment, and, most importantly, both poison and cure. 
Pharmakon can signify either a thing or its opposite, or, both a thing and its 
opposite. Just as “supplementarity” as derrida uses it in Of Grammatology 
invites or reinstates the very thing it is used to expel, the pharmakon intro-
duces the possibility of, from one perspective, a meeting of opposites, and 
from another, of opposition itself. To put a somewhat platitudinous spin on 
the term, we could characterize the pharmakon as something like a “neces-
sary evil.” The terms “drug” and “medicine” encapsulate this ambiguity well, 
and when thought of in a contemporary context simultaneously foreground 
the etymological wormhole through which the pharmaceutical industry 
appears to us, today, imbued with an almost limitless power to save and to 
cure, and — especially as regards anti-depressants and Selective Serotonin 
re-uptake inhibitors (SSris) — to edit, to block, to inhibit, and, in doing 
so, to release.
indeed, it is worth noting the powerful confluences between the con-
notations and perceived “mission” of the pharmaceutical industry and med-
ical science; while these industries seem to delimit quite different practical 
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fields, they function under the same set of cultural connotations (relations to 
progress, development, the problematics of disease and death), and a strik-
ingly similar investment in the promise and in imagined futures or the virtu-
al. donna Haraway unites these industries under the name “technoscience,” 
reminding us to see the technical practices at the core of so much that hap-
pens today in the name of “science,” “medicine,” “health,” and “progress”: 
“Technoscience extravagantly exceeds the distinction between science and 
technology as well as those between nature and society, subjects and objects, 
and the natural and artifactual that structured the imaginary time called 
modernity” (3). Haraway’s technoscience is an important touchstone, as she 
explicitly positions it as an ongoing material-semiotic or science-fictional 
strategy of combination and category (con)fusion, a strategy of supplemen-
tarity, of the pharmakon. 
reflecting on the pharmakon in terms of contemporary society and its 
fascination with medical science and a pharmaceuticalized lifestyle provides 
an interesting context for understanding the ambiguous status of Crake’s 
technoscience. in contemporary culture, questions regarding “what is a dis-
ease?” and “what is a cure?” are increasingly complex and even absurd given 
the tight integration of, for instance, pharmaceutical companies and their 
branding/marketing firms, not to mention the demands to maximize profit 
placed on public companies by shareholders (questions of profit/loss, and 
cost/benefit, are equally rendered absurd in this scenario). The documentary 
Selling Sickness (2004) details the way in which pharmaceutical companies 
such as GlaxoSmithKline are increasingly designing not only drugs to aid 
in the treatment of “disorders,” but disorders themselves.
One of the world’s leading anti-depressants, Paxil, manufactured by 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), greatly expanded its markets by promoting 
the drug for a range of new psychiatric conditions. Shyness is thus 
transformed into “Social anxiety disorder” (Sad), constant worry has 
become “Generalized anxiety disorder” (Gad) and premenstrual ten-
sion is now “Pre-Menstrual dysphoric disorder” (PMdd). 
(SBS Television)
This medicalization of fringe aspects of “normal” life, coupled with the 
pharmaceuticalization of ever-larger numbers of the populace (the film notes 
that up to twenty-five percent of the U.S. population could be considered 
candidates for Social anxiety disorder according to GSK’s definition of 
the condition), points to a powerful codetermination of disorder and cure, 
drug as remedy and drug as poison at the same time, in one and the same 
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drug; moreover, the identification of the “patient” — that is, the being who is 
poisoned — is enacted in the same moment, in one and the same movement, 
in which a market is identified and constructed.
The BlyssPluss pill Crake develops provides the simplest manifestation 
of this logic. as Crake explains to Jimmy, BlyssPluss is to be marketed on 
three characteristics: it will “protect the user against all known sexually 
transmitted diseases,” “provide an unlimited supply of libido and sexual 
prowess,” and prolong youth (294). it is an all-purpose sexual cure-all. a 
final characteristic Crake describes, which is not to be made public, is that 
BlyssPluss would also sterilize the user, “thus automatically lowering the 
population level” (294). Crake reminds Jimmy of the population problems 
the world is now facing: “as a species we’re in deep trouble, worse than 
anyone’s saying. They’re afraid to release the stats because people might just 
give up, but take it from me, we’re running out of space-time” (295). This 
characteristic too appears as a “cure,” although for a different ill. This pill, 
which of course “sells itself,” is at the same time designed with a different 
purpose in mind; the wholesale destruction of the human race. Having been 
marketed worldwide, when the virus in the pill is activated, a global pan-
demic emerges as in any fantasy of global outbreak, complete with outbreak 
centres dotting world maps with red flashing lights: “Then the next one hit, 
and the next, the next, the next, rapid-fire. Taiwan, Bangkok, Saudi arabia, 
Bombay, Paris, Berlin. The pleeblands west of Chicago. The maps on the 
monitor screens lit up, spackled with red as if someone had flicked a loaded 
paintbrush at them” (324). even this poison is, for Crake, a kind of cure for 
the malaise of humanity as such. The sentences he makes with his fridge 
magnets, which through the novel provide an index of his current preoccu-
pations, turn distinctly metaphysical and open-ended towards the end of the 
book: “To stay human is to break a limitation”; “i think, therefore” (301). 
Crake’s misanthropy — “We’re hormone robots anyway, only we’re faulty 
ones” (166) — and his analysis of human frailty — the pettiness, addictions, 
emotional entanglements, violence, and urges he reduces human beings 
to — is solved by the two-part move of destroying the current human race 
and introducing the “Children of Crake” from the Paradice Project as the 
perfected “human” inheritors of the world.
Crake is a kind of bioterrorist of the inside, a pharmakeus who leads all 
who follow him into opposition with themselves. He works within the sys-
tem of the corporates, but maintains an unpredictable streak of calculating 
anarchy that allows him to be both inside and outside, poison and cure at 
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the same time. Crake, who so perfectly manages to play the corporate game 
that he is given an almost unlimited r&d budget for his Paradice Project, 
ultimately wishes to rewrite all the rules of the human condition and begin 
again with Version Two of the Human. Behind air-locks and locked doors, 
in the secure heart of the Compound, and under the very noses of the 
rejoovenesense top brass, Crake builds the future of the human, and pre-
pares for the extinction of Version One, fervently engineering the end of the 
society that feeds and maintains both the Compounds and the Pleeblands.
* * *
atwood’s speculative fiction speaks directly to contemporary life, presenting 
a world that may not necessarily have “happened,” but which has certainly 
already been dreamt of, war-gamed, speculated upon, and which already 
exists in a less hyperbolic or carnivalesque fashion. The Pleeblands, despite 
their depiction as dens of absolute iniquity (which owes more to a discursive 
need to set up an easy polarization of urban spaces than any real sense of 
abjection), are nevertheless composed of most of the aspects of the everyday 
that constitute life in the West in the early years of the twenty-first century: 
cities as localities of great plurality and multiplicity, open (and closed) sexu-
ality, hyperconsumption and capitalism; sex, drugs, and personal expression; 
biotechnology and bio-terrorism; and protests against the movements of 
multinational corporations, G8 and WTO summits. The internet in the 
novel, awash with pornography and fetishes of every imaginable kind, is not 
a great deal different from the current state of the internet as of this writing; 
the difference is simply that atwood chooses to downplay the commercial 
aspects of the internet in favour of the sexual and voyeuristic.
The properties of the pills, medicines, and drugs in the book are also 
not very far removed from contemporary “medicine.” BlyssPluss appears as 
a combination of Viagra, Human Growth Hormone (HGH), and standard 
vaccinations, a catch-all panacea wonder drug, the encapsulation of cur-
rent fantasies of the transcendence of human frailty. indeed, Jimmy’s ironic 
litany of promises espoused by the anooYoo pills resembles nothing more 
than a concatenation of the promises found in any survey of contemporary 
“spam” marketing emails, and the questionability of the promise, here, is of 
prime importance. Spam is an important referent, as its tone almost perfectly 
matches the overblown hyped-up promises of an achievable and perfected 
post-humanity evinced by the products in atwood’s text. Spam messages 
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are driven by a hyperbolic logic of breathless case-studies and amazing facts, 
underpinned by faith in the technoscientific panacea:
We have been on the spray for just 3 weeks now, and besides the tremen-
dous energy we both feel, my husband’s allergies and spells of depression 
have lifted. i am healing extremely fast after an accident and have lost 
7 lbs. without trying!
Pheros is a lovely fragrance with a touch of human pheromones, pack-
aged in a [sic] exclusive crafted box. Pheros is a foolproof tool of seduc-
tion, the scent and the pheromones together make a foolproof combina-
tion. No one can resist the wearer of this mysterious fragrance! Pheros 
combines high tech science with the well-known function of the scent 
of a luxorious [sic] perfume.1
Spam functions almost solely on the weight and value of the promise, that 
which is always yet-to-come, for what is bought and sold is never done 
so in terms of the here and now. atwood’s world is a world according to 
spam; a world of barrages of media messages raining down on a waiting 
populace: a world in which diseases, disorders, and conditions that, like 
GlaxoSmithKline’s Social anxiety disorder and Generalized anxiety 
disorder, are created in one and the same movement as their “cures” are 
“discovered”; a world in which biotechnology and medical science experi-
ment with “the art of the possible.” Biotechnology presents a number of pos-
sibilities, a number of avenues down which science may wish to travel and 
biology to follow. These possibilities are expressed, in the book, through the 
simplicity of the act of splicing. But the book also presents biology in poten-
tia, as a virtuality, a thing that is always coming into being, not yet here. it 
is not the case that the biotechnological promise presents us with faits accom-
plis — it is not that the products of biotechnological experimentation have 
all already been envisioned, laid out, planned, and just need to be “realized.” 
They are not “possible” in that sense. rather, biotechnological experimenta-
tion presents us with a virtual biology, an unpredictable virtual biology in 
the process of being actualized. The “human,” in this schema, is something 
that has simultaneously already been surpassed, and has also never been 
reached. “Humanity” is always virtual, always coming into being, always 
up for grabs by or promised to whatever regime has the rhetorical power to 
grasp hold of it for however long, and the scientific/economic power to back 
up its truth claims. The human, in atwood’s text, is both something on its 
way out, due to be replaced, an old model that has done its time, and also a 
promise, something always yet to appear.
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as a speculative fiction, then, atwood’s text sits in a “not too distant 
future” that is yet alarmingly familiar. The fact that nothing in the book 
really comes as a surprise does not, however, lessen its impact or its import-
ance. atwood foregrounds certain aspects of modernity through a strategy 
of “masquerade,” of critique through hyperbole, and forces a second look 
at contemporary life, revealing the power plays, marketing strategies, and 
processes of mythography that are already at work in its construction and 
constant re-realization. Most importantly, she turns considerable satirical 
scrutiny on biotechnology and technoscience. in doing so, she exposes a 
deeper seam at which the material and the semiotic meet: the biotechno-
logical and capitalistic manipulation of nature, technology, and the human. 
despite her stated desire to question not biotechnology but human hubris, 
which translates into an unstated desire to keep human actions and inten-
tions separate from techno-scientific practice, atwood dramatizes the ease 
with which distinctions between these formations can be done away with. 
She does this through rhetorical strategies of linguistic usage and writing 
that easily elide distinctions between the biological and the technical.
in the first instance, atwood creates a world in which the brand is high-
ly performative, and is central to the experience and constitution of life. 
everything is branded, and everything is owned; the logo is the logos, Word 
of the capitalist God. donna Haraway’s New World Order inc, with its 
postulation of “Man the brand”, “Nature™ and Culture™,” finds its fictional 
manifestation in the world atwood creates (Haraway 74, 112). The adver-
tising slogans and brand names are obviously cynical, over the top; they 
exhibit their dreamed-up-ness almost as a badge of authenticity. They also 
echo their actual (or imagined) function in their names; anooYoo promises 
precisely that, a new you, through their endless range of self-help and self-
improvement products. NooSkins makes the same promise — a new skin. 
Where contemporary pharmaceuticals tend to pack their brand names with a 
pseudo-medical aura of scientificity and a hint of joy or freedom (e.g., Xanax, 
Viagra, Prozac, Claritin, Cele-brex), atwood’s brands strip off the scientific 
veneer and go straight for the consumer’s primary pulsion, the all-purpose 
medical lifestyle solution.
in depicting a world so starkly reducible to brands, slogans, and 
technoscientific panaceas, atwood presents a “masquerade” of contempor-
ary Western society, in which brands have become powerful signifiers of 
identity, and in which pharmaceutical companies create diseases and cures 
at the same time. rather than couching her critique in academic language, 
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however, atwood’s critique is packaged as a condensed expression of Marxist 
and Frankfurt-school-style critical theory. all that has been said about mass 
culture’s production of consumption and concurrent manufacture of lack, 
desire, and product/solution, all that has been said about the false conscious-
ness of commodity fetishism and a life lived according to the dictates of 
advertising media, is ironically encapsulated in a product like NooSkins, 
which answers the dream of regained youth with the promise of an entirely 
new epidermis. No mere quick-fix surface-level laser treatment, NooSkins is 
marketed as the key to crossing a whole new threshold of epidermal regener-
ation. atwood’s masquerade is manifest in the hyperbolic promise of the 
product.
at the same time, the omnipresence of the brand, and of multinational 
capitalist power, places life itself within the purview of the logo, or, more 
properly, the logos. Life, and increasingly the human, as things that are open 
to biotechnological tinkering, are now generated within the multinational 
capitalism of biotech firms, which operates according to the dualist logic of 
intellectual property and the market economy. in this sense, both what is 
biological and what is technological are structured by the logo, which brings 
with it all the power conferred upon any bearer of the logos: the power of the 
word, of definition and of truth, of patronage and filiation.
Secondly, the names given to the products of biotechnological experimen-
tation indicate the ambiguous power of language itself. alphabetic language 
is inherently recombinative; change a letter here and there, and you change 
a word, and a meaning. Combine two words, two separate semantic units, 
and you create a new semantic unit that takes connotations from both words 
to create a hybrid. Grammar — the technical system of la langue — pro-
vides us with the rules of this game. atwood foregrounds this recombina-
tive nature of language, and implicitly relates it to the highly recombinant 
technoscience of the novel. The brand names and hybrid animals she has 
dreamt up are indicative of the performative function of much biotech-
nological rhetoric. There is a way in which language cleanly encapsulates 
all that technoscience accomplishes, through the simple joining of words. 
indeed, the word used in both atwood’s text and in many other writings on 
biotechnology to describe these hybridizations — “splice” — testifies to the 
apparent simplicity of this operation. Splicing, like the “cut and paste” of 
most software applications, provides not merely a non-scientific metaphor 
for actual practices, but a model or program of possibility. The rakunk, the 
wolvog, and the spoat/gider all come into being at the moment that two 
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simple nouns are merged, and they do so in the guise of a pseudo-science 
based, in the public estimation of it anyway, on the free transferability of 
generic genetic particles or matter, an open recombinative possibility. as a 
signifier, the spoat/gider’s signified is not tardy, as it is the result of a simple 
rhetorical act of addition, and “decoding” the spoat/gider is the work of a 
moment. a combinatory matrix codes everything that takes place in either 
language, technoscience or the market, and it renders everything accom-
plishable through language, which is to say through writing, which itself 
echoes a similarly recombinative nature. 
Making her reference explicit by having Crake attend the Watson Crick 
institute, atwood aims her critique at the “building blocks of life” theor-
ies of the early molecular biologists, and, by implication, at more recent 
biotechnological experiments. Crake is a biological determinist, believing 
also in a logical biology, a biologic of sense. art, for instance, exists for a 
purely biological function: “The male frog, in mating season, makes as much 
noise as it can. The females are attracted to the male frog with the biggest, 
deepest voice… . So that’s what art is, for the artist… . an empty drainpipe. 
an amplifier. a stab at getting laid” (168). everything is there for a reason, 
and nothing should be there for no reason. in his design for the Children of 
Crake, nothing extraneous is included, and all indeterminacy is removed.
Crake’s world view is thus of an infinitely malleable, editable world 
made up of discrete entities linked by cause and effect. as a graduate of 
the Watson Crick institute, he inherits Watson and Crick’s reductionist 
“Central dogma.” The Central dogma formulated by molecular biologists 
in the 1950s held that the base sequence of genes, or dNa, directly and 
completely specified the sequence of amino acids in a protein. it further 
“assumed that the amino acid sequence of a protein determines its three-
dimensional structure and, by implication, its function. Hence, it seemed 
logical that the shape of hemoglobin, its colour, and the way it transports 
oxygen in the blood are all determined by ‘the hemoglobin gene’” (Hubbard 
44). From this Central dogma stemmed the various popular genetic-deter-
minist beliefs in genes as “programmes” for life, and Crake’s technoscience 
is the manifestation of this belief. His answer, for instance, to the problem 
of death is to re-interpret immortality as the absence of the fear of death; 
using a particularly literary metaphor, he suggests that you simply “edit out 
the fear” (303). His design for the Children of Crake is similarly additive or 
subtractive. The Children of Crake are vegetarian, eating mostly leaves, nuts, 
and twigs. To get the maximum benefit from their diet, Crake designed 
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them, like hares and rabbits, to recycle their own feces two or three times a 
week. Other convenient and biologically determinist splices involve borrow-
ing mating rituals from the baboons, and “the expandable chromosphores 
of the octopus” (164). Through Crake’s reductionist technoscience, and 
through the cut-and-paste naming strategies for the outcomes of biotech-
nological splicing, the function and power of language is explicitly linked 
to the practices of technoscience and bio-informatics.
From a slightly different angle, there is a conflation made between gen-
etic diversity and linguistic diversity, or between race and language. Part of 
the biotechnological eschatology that informs the book is the idea that with 
the death of the human race comes the death of language. This is an idea 
that is not uncommon in post-apocalyptic texts, generally figured within 
a cold-war, nuclear scenario. For instance, russell Hoban’s novel Riddley 
Walker is written in a broken-down, post-apocalyptic pidgin english: “On 
my naming day when i come 12 i gone fornt spear and kilt a wyld boar he 
parbly ben the las wyld pig on the Bundel downs any how there hadnt ben 
none for a long time befor him nor i aint looking to see none agen” (Hoban 
1). after the end of civilization and the decimation of humanity through 
a nuclear war, survivors must rebuild not merely their technological infra-
structure, but their linguistic, cultural, and mythic infrastructure as well. 
Scavengers for food and technology, the survivors must also be linguistic 
scavengers, constructing new myths out of the remnants of old ones. The 
language of the desert-children in Mad Max Beyond Thunderdome (1985) 
evinces the same mixture of pidgin-english and reworked cultural myth. 
Without going to the extremes of Riddley Walker or Mad Max, atwood suf-
fuses her book with the sense of a lament for language, for words, and for 
the creative endeavours conducted with words. at the opening of the book, 
Snowman sits in his tree, trying to remember the sources and meanings of 
phrases that pop into his head unbidden: “‘in view of the mitigating,’ he says. 
He finds himself standing with his mouth open, trying to remember the rest 
of the sentence” (5). Throughout the book, there is a constant sense that 
language is slowly slipping away from him. He recites litanies of archaisms 
to himself, reminding himself that he is the final archive and repository of 
language and all that this entails: “‘Hang on to the words,’ he tells himself. 
The odd words, the old words, the rare ones. Valance. Norn. Serendipity. 
Pibroch. Lubricious. When they’re gone out of his head, these words, they’ll 
be gone, everywhere, forever. as if they had never been” (68).
Similarly, born in the relative vacuum of the laboratory, and bereft of 
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the inheritance of human culture, the Children of Crake speak a simplified, 
stripped-down language. They constantly ask questions of Snowman because 
his language refers to things that are now long gone: 
Toast is when you take a piece of bread — What is bread? Bread is when 
you take some flour — What is flour? We’ll skip that part, it’s too com-
plicated. Bread is something you can eat, made from a ground-up plant 
and shaped like a stone. You cook it … Please, why do you cook it? Why 
don’t you just eat the plant? Never mind that part — Pay attention. You 
cook it, and then you cut it into slices, and you put a slice into a toaster, 
which is a metal box that heats up with electricity — What is electricity? 
don’t worry about that. While the slice is in the toaster, you get out the 
butter — butter is a yellow grease, made from the mammary glands of 
— skip the butter. So, the toaster turns the slice of bread black on both 
sides with smoke coming out, and then this “toaster” shoots the slice up 
into the air, and it falls onto the floor. (98)
Snowman’s language, with which he explains his world and must explain 
the world also to the Children of Crake, is a storehouse, a mnemo-technic and 
archive, but what it preserves no longer exists. it is in this sense that the 
end of the human is figured — as a crisis of language and thus of memory. 
We can think this in terms of Bernard Stiegler’s postulation of the different 
kinds of memory. in Technics and Time I: The Fault of Epimetheus, Stiegler 
distinguishes between three types of memory through which the human 
develops: genetic memory, epigenetic memory, and epiphylogenetic memory 
(140). His concern is primarily to propose that it is the second and third 
types of memory that inform the first in the “invention” of the human; in 
Stiegler’s words, his interest lies in “the pursuit of the evolution of the living by 
means other than life” (135). That is to say, in a profound break with or min-
imally a challenge to evolutionary biology, that the human is not reducible 
to a genetic program, but rather, that the genetic is informed by what is epi-
genetic, or extra-genetic. as richard Beardsworth puts it, “Humanity ‘tran-
scends’ its genetic program in pursuing its life through means other than life 
(matter).” The prefix “epi” signifies an upon, over, above or in-addition-to. 
Stiegler’s formulation of epigenetic memory refers to the cultural memories, 
inscriptions, programs, and codes that we are not born with but that we are 
born into. epigenetic memories exist before us, we acquire them on top of 
our genetic make-up, and yet we live with them and according to them, at 
the same time as we build upon them: “To acquire something outside our 
genetic programming, then, this thing must exceed the biological. The epi-
genetic structure must pre-exist us; it must exist beyond our short lives to 
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be subject to inheritance and transmission” (Barnet). epigenetic memories 
exist externally to the human, but, through enculturation, through our entry 
into culture and all that this entails, become internal. 
The epigenetic is culture, or from a different perspective “the symbolic 
order,” which is received through and informed by language — it becomes 
the knowledge and memory of the central cortex, and for each of us as “indi-
viduals,” it dies when we die. However, epigenetic knowledge also exceeds 
us, in that language itself — both speech and writing as tekhnē  — does not 
die when each of us dies; language remains as a storage system for the rep-
etition and, crucially, reanimation of material and semiotic artifacts: “This 
epigenetic sedimentation, a memorization of what has come to pass, is what 
is called the past, what we shall name the epiphylogenesis of man, meaning 
the conservation, accumulation, and sedimentation of successive epigeneses” 
(Stiegler 140). Similarly, other technical artifacts remain also, spanning 
individual lives and deaths: our many and varied machines, the technologies 
that now fill and often even enable contemporary life. it is through these 
artifacts and memory supports that the human is constantly formed and 
reformed. This function of technics, as the ongoing support of consciousness, 
is what Stiegler calls epiphylogenetic, and this is also his image of human 
“evolution,” wherein the human is maintained and thus develops through 
the technical memory support.
Language and technics, then, are both part of the human. in atwood’s 
text, the epigenetic function of culture, and the epiphylogenetic function 
of language and technical artifacts, are both foregrounded through their 
destruction. Without the epigenetic and epiphylogenetic function of lan-
guage and technics, atwood suggests that there would be no human, only 
meaningless questions and meaningless answers — the meaninglessness of 
toast without a toaster, for instance. The human is always in flux, always 
becoming, always materializing, transducing, taking itself apart, putting 
itself back together, dis- and re-membering. Without memory, however, and 
therefore without memory supports, there can be no re-membering.
This is, essentially, the biotechnological eschatology of the novel. 
atwood’s novel inherits the discourses of the apocalypse and of the Last 
Man, and places them in the what-if scenario of the moment. Hers is an 
apocalypse of the human as much as it is of the world, civilization, and 
modernity. Not merely the end of the human as a population or race, but 
as a concept, and a set of biological and technical structures. it is the end 
of the human as constituted by a certain arrangement of dNa, and by the 
oryx and craKe 123
epigenetic and epiphylogenetic memory supports. Snowman/Jimmy is not 
merely the last man left standing, the sole survivor of the cleansing apoca-
lypse — he is also the Last Man, the last of the humans. We are presented 
throughout the novel with the possibility of the end of the human, and we 
have this ending systematically worked out through the disappearance or 
diminution of language, the destruction of the technological system, as well 
as the liquidation of most of the world’s inhabitants. Through the entire 
book, we live with this palpable sense of the end. Jimmy ekes out an exist-
ence scavenging amongst the remnants, trying vainly to remember the words 
that structure what for him constitutes human life, culture, and creativity. 
Whenever he speaks with the Children of Crake, those meek, laboratory-
born inheritors of the earth, he is reminded of all that is gone; his words 
make no sense, they break down in his mouth.
Of course, there are others; the novel ends in hope, garbled voices on the 
radio, a plume of smoke, another ragtag band of travellers; the Last Man is 
not the last, but one of a band. We can rebuild. although the ending smacks 
somewhat of a banal dénouement included for the purpose of tying up the 
narrative on a slightly hopeful, if ambiguous, note, we are reminded that 
the end may not necessarily be the end. The end of one understanding of 
the human is the beginning of another; as donna Haraway might say, what 
counts as human will shift. Given time, even the Children of Crake may 
come to count as human, as their language develops, as they mythologize 
and epigeneticize.
according to atwood’s definition, the novel is not science fiction but specu-
lative fiction; it is a reflection on the various states or statuses of contem-
porary human being, doing and ending. in her novel the human appears 
in many guises, and language and technics play different roles in this per-
formance. The human is something organic that has been destroyed by 
something pharmaceutical; it is physical, something susceptible to disease. 
The human is also an organization of biological particles that has had its 
day, supplanted by the biotechnological spawn of the laboratory. The human 
is a function of memory supports and the trace, of language and technical 
infrastructure; with the disappearance of these supports, the status of the 
human is threatened. On all these levels, atwood’s text charts an end to the 
human. Yet the human is also a promise, a virtual biology that exists as a 
function of technoscientific writing and capitalistic speculation. The human 
is something that has both come and gone and is always yet to arrive; its 
temporalization is heterogeneous.
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if, simultaneously, biotechnological practices present a threat to the 
human when left to spiral out of control, we are reminded that the human is 
already technical, and thus cannot exist without technics — that is, without 
external memory supports, without linguistic and technical infrastructure. 
Similarly, there is no technics without the human, and we are reminded 
that the human is fundamentally implicated in biotechnology, and vice-
versa. While the overreaching of biotechnology is taken to alarming and 
satirical extremes in the novel, at the same time, technics as such is revealed 
as essential to the very thing that biotechnics seems to be putting in danger, 
that is, the human.
Note
1 These quotations are taken from “spam” e-mail marketing messages i received during 
2002-2003.
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